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 Prepared by Capt Wayne P. Hughes , Jr., USN (Retired)
 We Were Soldiers
 Once... And Young
 by Harold G. Moore
 Lieutenant General, USA
 (Retired) and
 Joseph L. Galloway
 New York, Random House,
 1992, 41 2 pages.
 This waiting is the 20 book years. for which I've been
 waiting 20 years.
 First, because it is good, even great, lit-
 erature. We Were Soldiers Once... And
 Young is so corny a title that only a battle
 hardened lieutenant general or a field-test-
 ed journalist could get away with it. But
 the title suits, because much of the book
 has a quality of poetry about it:
 "The [West Point] class of 1965 came
 out of the old America, a nation that
 disappeared forever in the smoke that
 billowed off the jungle battlegrounds
 where we fought and bled. The coun-
 try that sent us off to war was not
 there to welcome us home. It no
 longer existed. We answered the call
 of one President who was now dead;
 we followed the orders of another who
 would be hounded from office, and
 haunted, by the war he mismanaged
 so badly."
 Hal Moore relates the first big battle
 fought by Americans in Vietnam. He led
 it, and it changed the nature of the war.
 Co-author Joseph Galloway was the only
 journalist on the ground throughout the
 fighting. Perhaps the finest tribute to Gal-
 loway ' s - and Moore ' s - professionalism
 was when General Schwarzkopf "sum-
 moned the reporter [out of retirement] to
 his headquarters in Saudi Arabia, and said:
 "I'm sending you to the commander out
 here who is most like General Hal Moore,
 and the division which has the most chal-
 lenging and dangerous mission in my bat-
 tle plan." That was Major General Barry
 McCaffrey who took his 24th Infantry
 Division (Mechanized) on a hair-raising
 charge through western Iraq to the
 Euphrates River valley.
 In November 1965 the Army dropped
 450 men of Moore's 1st Battalion, 7th Cal-
 vary Regiment into the la Drang valley
 where 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers
 were, we thought, recuperating, but were in
 fact laying in wait. The Army was trying
 out brand new airmobile tactics that Moore
 helped develop. The People's Army of
 Vietnam were aware of and feared the new
 helicopter tactics and were conducting
 their own test! Moore's Army regulars,
 many veterans of Korea, fought off and
 severely punished the PAVN. But three
 days later only 2.5 miles away, a sister bat-
 talion was chopped up badly by the deter-
 mined and battle hardened North Viet-
 namese.
 The second value of the book is the skill
 with which both the tactics and the human
 side of close combat are described in
 detail. Moore and Galloway are writing
 not merely a personal memoir but a tribute
 to all the officers and men who fought at la
 Drang. Their research is massive. Quota-
 tions from the participants even to include
 the families of the men who never came
 home infuse every chapter almost to a
 fault. For the first time in the record of the
 Vietnam War to my knowledge the authors
 also recount the battle in detail from the
 enemy's point of view. They do this from
 interviews with the PAVN leaders at the
 scene - for example General Nguyen Huu
 An who was a lieutenant colonel and
 deputy commander at the battle; General
 Chu Huy Man who directed the opera-
 tions in the Vietnamese highlands sur-
 rounding the la Drang valley; and North
 Vietnam's own military historian, Major
 General Hoang Phuong.
 If there is a weakness in the narrative it
 is a tone which is epic-heroic. There are
 no cowards, no villains and few incompe-
 tents. I for one am glad to accept Moore's
 blind eye. In the circumstances the
 admirable must have overwhelmed the
 contemptible almost everywhere.
 In the third place, so competent a book
 provides rich food for all analysts who are
 charmed by the power of computers.
 Computer simulations that strive for great
 physical fidelity simply miss the point of a
 battle and its analysis. Combat is a confu-
 sion of physical, mental and spiritual attrib-
 utes. I do not wish to say we must capture
 the minds and wills of fighters in our mod-
 els; quite the contrary after doing our best
 we cannot, and so striving for better under-
 standing via more physical fidelity is, at
 great expense, walking up a blind alley.
 Desert Storm, with all its so called "sur-
 prises" for attrition-oriented combat mod-
 elers was fought in a clean and pure envi-
 ronment compared to the Vietnamese jun-
 gle. Even veteran analysts will profit from
 reading this well-organized, clearly devel-
 oped and exquisitely detailed battle record
 by Moore and Galloway. It is one thing to
 spout commonplaces about the limits of
 combat analysis; it is another to feel the
 extent of these limits by being there. And
 the authors do as well as can be at putting
 you in the minds of young fighters in a jun-
 gl . To correct some overenthusiasm for
 physical fidelity it's time to reaffirm some
 old lessons from the World War II ana-
 lysts: real data is dirty data, and wartime
 analysis at its most thoughtful, useful and
 objective corrects big problems and mea-
 sures gross errors with "hemibel thinking."
 That's also a good message for the pro-
 ponents of SIMNET and other manifesta-
 tions of "virtual reality." For one thing, the
 desert environment and battlefield repro-
 duction now being modeled purportedly
 with the aim of virtual weapon testing
 smacks of using a laboratory to commit the
 crime of fighting the last war. Moore and
 Galloway's book reminds us that we need
 a jungle battlefield and some bitter moun-
 tainous terrain before we buy off on test
 results of a new long range weapon, a
 faster tank, or a UAV sensor. For another,
 the book will remind us that reproduction
 of actual battle with perfect fidelity is
 merely a reproduction of chaos. The whole
 (See PROFESSIONAL READING, p. 12)
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 art of wartime analysis is to bring meager
 understanding of violent, emotion-ridden
 phenomena that at first appear to have no
 pattern whatsoever!
 Fourth and last, I deeply admire the
 book's attitude toward the whole Vietnam
 War. Here in the interest of truth-in-adver-
 tising I must confess my own prejudice. In
 1976 I wrote an essay concluding: "Much
 has been written about the start of the
 war...But not enough has been said about
 the end of it. It is one thing to have lost the
 war, which is what history will record. It is
 another to have chosen to withdraw from it
 for moral reasons...; which history will for-
 get. But it is something else, and much
 worse, to have given the war away, which
 was what happened; and history will never
 know." If enough books are written with
 the skill and tenderness of We Were Sol-
 diers Once... And Young , then perhaps in
 time history will come to know the sick
 naivety of the pacifists who thought they
 were helping, the scandalous rationaliza-
 tion of those who fled the draft, the pur-
 poseful distortions of the Saigon and
 Washington press corps, and the dreadful
 military leadership manifest in our policy
 of graduated escalation. Whether history
 ever comes to know these things about the
 Vietnam War, happily the young lieutenant
 colonels in the field learned its real lessons,
 as exhibited by not only Lieutenant Gener-
 al Hal Moore, but also General Colin Pow-
 ell and General Norman Schwarzkopf. O
 Remembering Walt Deemer, A Statesman of OR
 [This piece w as distilled from the remarks
 made by Clay Thomas and Al Lieberman
 at the memorial senice for Walter. - Guest
 Ed.]
 Walter about many Deemer him facets. that was A are few generally a man things of
 many facets. A few things
 about him that are generally
 not known by most of his friends and col-
 leagues are the facts that WTalter was a
 superb dancer and that he was an enthusi-
 ast of fencing in his younger days.
 Walter was bom on 1 1 December 1909
 in Aguascalientes, Mexico where his father
 was working as a doctor. Five years later,
 his mother took him to Pennsylvania where
 he spent most of his youth. At age 15,
 demonstrating the independence he would
 later be known for. he ran away from
 home, got a job on a freighter and sailed to
 Mexico to visit his father. He spent a year
 there and then returned home to Pennsyl-
 vania.
 In 1935 Walter graduated from Lehigh
 University and in 1942 from Harvard Uni-
 versity with a doctorate in psychometrics.
 From 1945 to 1949 he did postgraduate
 studies in mathematics at the University of
 North Carolina.
 Walter's professional career started in
 the United States Air Force during World
 War II. He served as an officer from 1942
 to 1953 and then continued in the Air
 Force reserves. Clay Thomas remem-
 bered numerous major contributions Wal-
 ter made during his Air Force career,
 including conceiving a program of studies
 that led to the early uses of computers in
 operations analysis. One of the papers
 Walter published on "operational gaming"
 in 1957 in the journal of Operations
 Research won the coveted Lanchester
 Prize.
 Walter retired from the Air Force with
 the rank of Colonel. During military ser-
 vice, he received the Legion of Merit, a
 decoration awarded by the United States
 for performance of outstanding service.
 From 1949 to 1965, Walter worked for
 a forerunner of what is known today as Air
 Force Studies and Analyses, first as an Air
 Force officer and then as a civilian opera-
 tions analyst. In 1965 Walter moved to the
 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as
 Deputy Assistant Director of the Weapons
 Evaluation and Control Bureau. During
 his ACDA time he guided the various divi-
 sions of the WEC Bureau and provided
 input from ACDA to the joint
 ACDA/DOD project known as CLOUD
 GAP, a project that provided the first expe-
 rience for the United States in arms control
 on-site inspection procedures. Today
 some of these same procedures are used in
 inspections being conducted in the Former
 Soviet Union. An additional contribution
 that Walter made during that period, and
 one which had a great impact on ACDA,
 was the initiative he took in creating the
 Operations Analysis Division. For his
 many contributions to ACDA, Walter
 received the Superior Honor Award in July
 1970. when he retired.
 But Walter didn't really retire. From
 1970 to 1992 he served as a consultant to
 ACDA and it is said by many that he
 worked even harder during this "retire-
 ment" than he had during his full time
 employment period.
 Walter made numerous invaluable con-
 tributions to MORS and received a number
 of MORS' awards. He was elected to the
 MORS Board of Directors and served dur-
 ing the crucial years from 1968 through
 1971. It was his initiative and energy that
 led MORS to publish its first monograph in
 1972. In 1976 he co-authored a paper on
 "Estimating Combat Requirements for
 Naval Surface to Air Missiles" that won
 the Rist Prize for the best paper at a Gener-
 al Session. In 1982 he was awarded the
 prestigious MORS Wanner Award. And
 in 1992, he was made a Fellow of MORS
 in recognition of his service to MORS and
 to the entire operations research communi-
 ty-
 Walt was of Quaker background and
 inherited strong Quaker ethics, which were
 reflected throughout his professional
 career. When Walt did a job, it was not
 only superbly competent, it was also an
 honest piece of work. He was a model of
 what an OR statesman should be. MOR-
 Sians would do well to emulate him. O
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